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ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-JUSTIFIABLE WITHDRAWAL BY ATTORNEY-COM-
PENSATION.-The plaintiffs were engaged by the defendants to defend the
contest of a will upon a contingent fee basis. When the case was carried
almost to completion, the defendants charged the plaintiffs with having
forged a mortgage and having deceived the defendants with respect thereto.
The plaintiffs thereupon withdrew from the case and, the will being subse-
quently sustained, brought suit for the agreed fee less the cost of completing
the case. From a judgment for the plaintiffs the defendants appealed. Hold
(one justice dissenting), that the judgment be affirmed. Bonham v. Farmer,
148 S. E. 878 (S. C. 1929).
It is well recognized that conduct on the part of a client tending to
humiliate or degrade his attorney is sufficient ground for the latter's with-
drawal from the case. Genro;w v. Flynn, 166 Mich. 564, 131 N. W. 1115
(1911), 35 L. R. A. (N. s.) 960 (1912); 1 THORNTON, ATTORNEYS AT LAW
(1914) § 139. Such conduct on the part of the client is said to be equivalent
to a discharge. Genrow v. Flynn, supra. Generally, where an attorney has
been discharged through no fault of his own he may recover only the
reasonable value of the services already rendered. Andrewes v. Haas, 214
N. Y. 255, 108 N. E. 423 (1915); Spellman v. Bankers' Trust Co., 6 F.
(2d) 799 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925). This standard of compensation is based on
the historical concept that the relation of attorney and client is of a nature
so peculiarly confidential that the client should be privileged to terminate
the relationship whenever he considers it necessary. Consequently, he should
not be made to suffer for having exercised his privilege, but should be re-
quired to pay his discharged attorney only the reasonable value of the
services rendered. Martin r. Camp, 219 N. Y. 170, 114 N. E. 46 (1916),
L. R. A. 1917 F 402. A minority view, represented by the instant case,
allows the attorney the agreed compensation less the cost of completing the
work. Searson v. Sams, 142 S. C. 558,141 S. E. 107 (1928). The latter view
might operate beneficially in preventing a client from substituting, at his
pleasure, a comparatively small recovery on quantum meruit for a large
contingent fee. Cf. French v. Cunningham, 149 Ind. 632, 49 N. E. 797
(1898).
BILLS AND NOTES-FAILURE OF FOREIGN CORPORATION TO COMPLY WITH
CONDITIONS OF DOING BUSINESS WITHIN STATE-EFFECT ON HOLDER IN DUE
COURSE OF DRAFT DRAWN BY CORPORATION.-The S company, a foreign
corporation doing business in New York, drew a trade acceptance on the
defendant, payable to itself. The draft was discounted before maturity
by the plaintiff bank, an alleged holder in due course. The S company had
failed to comply with the conditions of doing business within the state pro-
vided by § 16 of the General Corporation Law, which further provided that
a foreign corporation failing to comply with such conditions, or any assignee
of, or any person claiming under such corporation, should not be allowed to
sue in New York on any contract made by the corporation in New York.
N. Y. CONS. LAWS ANN. (Cahill Supp. 1928) c. 24, § 16. The plaintiff set
up § 57 of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, providing that "a holder
in due course holds the instrument . . . free from defenses available to
prior parties among themselves." N. Y. CONS. LAWS (Cahill, 1923) c. 39,
§ 96. The jury found that the S company had been doing business in the
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state within the meaning of the General Corporation Law and returned a
verdict for the defendant, which the plaintiff moved to set aside. Hc,
that the motion be granted. Allison Hill Trust Co. v. Sarandrea, 236 N. Y.
Supp. 265 (Sup. Ct 1929).
In most states there are statutes limiting the enforcement of contracts
made by foreign corporations doing business within the state be-fore com-
plying with specified requirements. Where the statute merely provides that
the non-complying corporation shall not maintain an action on the contract
in the courts of that state, such a statute is held to be unavailable as a de-
fense to the drawee of a bill of exchange drawn by such corporation or
to the maker of a promissory note payable to the corporation in a suit
brought by a holder in due course. McMann v. Walkor, 31 Colo. 261, 72
Pac. 1055 (1903); Edwards v. Hambly Frdt Products Co, 133 Tenn. 142,
180 S. W. 163 (1915). But where such statutes declare contracts of the
corporation to be "void," such negotiable instruments have been held to be
unenforceable against the drawee or maker by a holder in due course.
Jones v. Martin, 15 Ala. App. 675, 74 So. 761 (1917); ALA. CODE (1928)
§ 7220; ARIz. REv. STAT. (1913) par. 2228. Where, as in six states, the
statutes declare the contracts to be "void" as to the corporation and its
"assignees," a holder in due course is allowed to recover against the
drawee or maker. National Bank of Commerce v. PicT 13 N. D. 74, 90
N. W. 63 (1904) ; Commercial National Bank v. Jordan, 71 Fla. 566, 71 So.
760 (1916); CAL. GEN. LAws (Deering, 1923) act 1743, § 1; FLA. GEN.
LAws (Skillman, 1927) § 6029; N. D. CouIP. LAws ANN. (1913) § 5242;
OHIO GEN. CODE (Page, 1926) § 5508; S. D. REv. CODE (1919) § 8909; Wis.
STAT. (1927) 226.02. The statutes of only five states expressly deny muit
to both "assignees" of and persons "claiming under" the corporation.
IOWA CODE (1927) § 8427; N. Y. CONS. LAWS, supra; R. I. GEN. LAWS
(1923) § 3532; UTAH COMP. STAT. (1917) par. 947 (352); VT. GE. LAWS
(1917) § 5009. Only in Utah has this clause been interpretcd with refer-
ence to § 57 of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, where, upon simi-
lar facts, the court reached a decision contrary to that of the instant case.
First National Bank v. Parker, 57 Utah 290, 194 Pac. 661 (1920). The
Utah court applied the mechanical rule of preference according to order of
enactment, concluding that the two statutes were irreconcilable. The in-
stant court, on the other hand, probably influenced by a more strongly
commercial environment and tradition, sought a solution of the problem
in considerations of commercial policy, and seems to have reached a more
satisfactory result.
BiLLS AN NOrES-FAMURE OF HOLDER TO PRESENT FOR PAYMENT NOTE
PAYABLE AT SPECIFIED BAN-EPECT OF SUBSEQUENT INSOLVENCY OF BANI.
-The defendants executed to the B bank their note payable at the bank
dnd containing a provision that, upon maturity, the bank could apply toward
payment of the note any of the maker's funds in the bank. Demand and
presentment were waived. The B bank indorsed this note to the C Credit
Co., which in turn indorsed it to the plaintiffs. At maturity the defendants
had on deposit at the B bank sufficient funds to meet the note, and shortly
thereafter sent a check in payment thereof, which the bank received and
charged to their account. No remittance was made to the holders, who
made no demand for payment until after the failure of the B bank. This
action was then brought. From a verdict for the plaintiffs for the principal
sum without interest or costs, the defendants appealed. Held, that the
judgment be affirmed. Federal Intermediate Credit Bank v. Epstin, 148
S. E. 713 (S. C. 1929).
The instant case expressly overrules National Banhing Ass'n v. Zorm
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14 S. C. 444 (1881), heretofore the leading minority case. The majority
view, to which this court now conforms, is that the failure of the holder
to present a note payable at a specified bank does not preclude recovery
from the maker even though the latter, at maturity, had on deposit in the
payor bank sufficient funds to meet it, which were lost through failure of
the bank. Binghampton Pharmacy v. First National Bank, 131 Tenn. 711,
176 S. W. 1038 (1915); Moore v. Altem, 196 Ala. 158, 71 So. 681 (1916).
This rule prevailed prior to the Negotiable Instruments Law and has been
more widely followed since its adoption. Note (1919) 2 A. L. R. 1381. The
reasoning used to attain this result varies. Some courts seize upon the
point that the maker of a note is primarily liable upon it and, by stressing
the provision in § 70 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, that "presentment
for payment is not necessary to charge" such a party, reach the conclu-
sion that the risks involved in late presentment are on the maker. Bing-
hampton Pharmacy v. Firdt National Bank, supra. But cf. Northern Lum-
ber Co. v. Clausen, 201 Iowa 701, 208 N. W. 72 (1926) (failure to present
a check within reasonable time held to discharge maker to extent of loss
caused by the delay); NEGOTAB=LE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 186. Other courts
consider that the payor bank is the agent of the maker in receiving or
holding his funds and that therefore he must bear any loss caused by failure
of the bank. First National Bank of Omaha v. Chilvon, 45 Neb. 257, 63 N.
W. 362 (1895) ; Bartel v. Brown, 104 Wis. 493, 80 N. W. 801 (1899). Thus
the deposit of the maker does not constitute payment of the note but merely
tender which he may plead in exoneration of interest and costs. See Adams
v. Hackensack Improvement Com., 44 N. J. L. 638, 647 (1882); cf. NEGOTI-
ABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 70. But, where the holder has forwarded the note
to the bank at which it is payable and at which the maker has sufficient
funds on deposit, and the bank delays in effecting payment, the holder must
bear the risk of failure of the bank. Baldwin's Bank of Penn Yan v.
Smith, 215 N. Y. 76, 109 N. E. 138 (1915); Scott County Milling Co. v.
Weems, 19 S. W. (2d) 1027 (Ark. 1929). Thus the more diligent holder,
forwarding his note, is actually in a worse position than the one who neg-
lects to make presentment until after the failure of the bank. It is sub-
mitted that § 70 is intended to control the allegations and defenses of the
pleadings and that it is a misuse of that section to hold the holder to no
duty whatever to make presentment. While checks and notes obviously
differ in many ways and while § 186 of the Negotiable Instruments Law
expressly imposes a duty upon the holder of a check to make presentment
within a reasonable time, it does not necessarily follow that the holder of
a note is under no such duty. Such a requirement, if imposed, would shift
at least part of the risk from the maker who has provided funds sufficient
for payment to the holder without whose unreasonable delay no loss would
have been sustained.
CONSTITuTIoNAL LAw-Dun P 'csS-FALURE OF APPELLATE JUSTICES
To READ REcoRD.-After thorough oral argument by counsel, the Supreme
Court of Oklahoma decided a case by a five to four vote. The un-
successful party subsequently sought an injunction in the federal court
restraining enforcement of the judgment, on the ground that four of the
five concurring justices had not read the record and that their decision
therefore violated the "due process" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The injunction was denied. Held, on appeal, that the order be affirmed.
Owens v. Battenfield, 33 F. (2d) 753 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929).
It is well settled that a merely erroneous decision of a state court does
not constitute a denial of due process. Iowa Central Ry. v. Iowa, 160 U.
S. 389, 16 Sup. Ct. 344 (1896); Bonner v. Gorman, 213 U. S. 86, 29 Sup.
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Ct. 483 (1909). Nor is a decision subject to attack merely because reached
with rapidity. Tang Tun v. Edsell, 223 U. S. 673, 32 Sup. Ct. 359 (1912)
(decision by Secretary of Commerce and Labor). But an arbitrary or
capricious decision, or one based on a very gross error, might violate the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. v. Chicago, 166 U. S.
226, 17 Sup. Ct. 581 (1897) ; Thomas v. Texas, 212 U. S. 278, 281, 29 Sup.
Ct. 393 (1909); American Ry. Exp. Co. v. Kentucky, 273 U. S. 269, 273,
47 Sup. Ct. 353, 355 (.1927); Schofield, Federal Supreme Court and
State Law (1908) 3 " L. Rnv. 195. And due process, of course, requires
a mentally competent tribunal. See Jordan v. Massachsetts, 225 U. S.
167, 32 Sup. Ct. 651 (1912). A trial before a judge who has a direct, per-
sonal, and substantial pecuniary interest in the result is not due procec_.
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510, 47 Sup. Ct. 437 (1927); Note (1927) 40
HARv. L. Rv. 1149; (1927) 36 YAxs- L. J. 1171. An exception to thin rule
is sometimes made, however, when there is no other judge not equally dis-
qualified. Evans v. Gore, 253 U. S. 245, 40 Sup. Ct. 550 (1920). Nor will
a judge be disqualified when his pecuniary interest is remote and insignifi-
cant. Foreman -v. Marianna, 43 Ark. 324 (1884) ; 2 COoLEY, CONSrrruIoNAL
LImITATIONS (8th ed. 1927) 872. Personal bias may disqualify a judge.
Berger v. United States, 255 U. S. 22, 41 Sup. Ct. 230 (1921) (disqualified
by statute); Ez parte Cornwell, 144 Ala. 497, 39 So. 354 (1905); Note
(1921) 21 COL. L. Rv. 387. It has been suggested, however, that a decision
by a judge so disqualified would not necessarily violate due process. See
Tumey v. Ohio, supra at 523, 47 Sup. Ct. at 441. But see Jordan v. Massa-
chusetts, supra at 176, 32 Sup. Ct. at 652. A trial before a court dominated
by a mob is not due process. Moore v,. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86, 43 Sup. Ct.
265 (1923); cf. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309, 35 Sup. Ct. 582 (1915);
(1923) 33 YALE L. J. 82. Nor is a proceeding before a court actuated by
fraudulent motives. See-Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Bibcock, 204 U. S. 585,
27 Sup. Ct. 326 (1907); 3 WILLOUGMBY, THE CONsTrrtrroN (2d ed. 1929)
§ 1125. Due process is not denied where the opinion is written by a judge
who has not heard the oral argument, or even where the whole court declines
to hear oral argument. Wagner Electric Mfg. Co. v. Lyndon, 2G2 U. S. 226,
43 Sup. Ct. 589 (1923) ; Schmidt v. Boyle, 54 Neb. 387, 74 N. W. 964 (1898).
It would seem that a decision should not be open to collateral attack under
the Fourteenth Amendment unless there is clear and substantial evidence
that the case was not given fair consideration. Any other rule would be
impracticable, for it would expose nearly every decision to collateral attack.
See Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Babcock, supra at 593-596, 27 Sup. Ct. at 327-
328; Morley v. Lake Shore Ry., 146 U. S. 162, 171, 13 Sup. Ct. 54, 58 (1892).
There was no such evidence in the instant case. This conclusion is forti-
fied by the fact that the record in any given case is rarely read by all the
members of the court. See (1925) 9 J. Am. JuD. SoC. 50 et seq.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-FEDERAL TAXATION OF STATE INsauu Irrr E
-TAXATION OF STATE BANK.-The plaintiff state duly organized the Bank
of North Dakota, purchasing all of the capital stock for itself. The bank
paid, under protest, to the defendant federal revenue collector a capital
stock tax as provided by a federal statute. 40 STAT. 1057 (1919), 42 STAT.
227 (1921), 26 U. S. C. § 1262 (1926). In a suit to recover the amount ro
paid on the ground that the tax was unconstitutional since imposed on a
state instrumentality, the lower court decided in favor of the defendant.
Held, on appeal, that the judgment be affirmed. State of North Dakota v.
Olson, 33 F. (2d) 848 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929).
The general principle that the state and federal governments should be
free from iind- ;ntre~---nee from outside sources in the exerci, -" "-ir
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governmental functions is applied to numerous situations. Thus, the govern-
ment is not responsible for the torts of its agents committed in the perform-
ance of governmental functions unless it has assumed such responsibility
by constitutional or legislative enactment. Stephens v. Commissioners of
Palisades Interstate Park, 93 N. J. L. 500, 108 Atl. 645 (1919); State v.
Sharp, 21 Ariz. 424, 189 Pac. 631 (1920); Smith v. State, 227 N. Y. 405,
125 N. E. 841 (1920). And the instrumentalities of federal and state gov-
ernments are each exempt from taxation by the. other. Collector v. Day,
11 Wall. 113 (U. S. 1870) ; Frey v. Woodworth, 2 F. (2d) 725 (E. D. Mich.
1924) (income of employee of street railway operated by city held not sub-
ject to federal income tax); Mercantile National Bank v. City of New
York, 121 U. S. 138, 7 Sup. Ct. 826 (1887) (state bonds held exempt from
federal taxation); Farmers' and Mechanics' Savings Bank v. Minnesota,
232 U. S. 516, 34 Sup. Ct. 354 (1914) (federal bonds held non-taxable by
state); see Cohen and Dayton, Federal and State Taxation (1925) 34 YALE
L. J. 807, 821. Where a government carries on a private enterprise chiefly
for pecuniary profit, however, it is generally held that it loses its immunity
to tort actions. Chafor v. Long Beach, 174 Cal. 478, 163 Pac. 670 (1917) ;
Sloan Shipyards v. United States Shipping Board, 258 U. S. 549, 42 Sup.
Ct. 386 (1922); Borchard, Government Liability in Tort (1924) 34 YAU
L. J. 1, 24. It would seem reasonable to hold that it loses its immunity to
taxation under the same circumstances. There is substantial agreement
in holding the operation of gas, electric light and water works by the gov-
ernment to be subject to federal taxation as private functions. Flint v.
Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, 31 Sup. Ct. 342 (1910); see Note (1925) 38
HARv. L. Rnv. 793, 795. And a state's dispensary for the sale of liquor has
likewise been held non-exempt. South Carolina v. United States, 199 U. S.
437, 26 Sup. Ct. 110 (1905). Banking would seem to possess more of the
characteristics of a private business than do public utilities or liquor dis-
pensaries. Furthermore, if immunity to federal taxation were to be extended
to the type of activity involved in the instant case, it would seem reasonable
to expect to find the various states assuming control over many other objects
of internal revenue, thereby depriving the national government of a valu-
able source of income. Cf. South Carolina v. United States, supra at 454, 26
Sup. Ct. at 113 (1905).
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-REIMBURSEMIENT OF
EMPLOYER BY THIRD PARTY WRONGDOER FOR PAYMENTS TO STATE FUND.-
A New York statute provides that when an employee covered by the Work-
men's Compensation Law is killed in the course of his employment, and
no dependents claim under the act, the employer or his insurance carrier
shall pay $500 into each of two funds, one to rehabilitate men injured in
industry, and the other to provide extra compensation for men whose cecond
partial injury results in total incapacitation. N. Y. CONS. LAWS (Cahill,
1923) c. 66, § 15 (8, 9). [The latter loss formerly fell on the employer or
insurance carrier concerned. See Matter of State Industrial Commission
v. Newman, 222 N. Y. 363, 366, 118 N. E. 794, 795 (1918)] It is further
provided that if the employee's death is due to the wrongful act of a third
party the employer or his insurance carrier may collect from this wrong-
doer the $1000 that has been paid. N. Y. CONS. LAWS (Cahill, 1923) c. 66,
§ 29. The defendant negligently killed an employee of the plaintiff, and
settled the widow's claim for $15,000, which was more than the average
full compensation under the Compensation Law. Since this settlement left
no dependents to claim under the Compensation Law, the insurance carrier
was forced to pay $1000 to the aforesaid state funds, and now brings suit
under § 29 of the instant statute. On an agreed statement of facts the
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Appellate Division gave judgment for the plaintiff. Phoenix Indemnity Co.
v. Staten Island Rapid Transit Ry., 224 App. Div. 346, 230 N. Y. Supp.
747 (2d Dep't 1928). Held, on appeal (two judges dissenting), that the
judgment be affirmed. Phoenix Indemnity Co. v. Statcn Island Rapid Tra=-
d4 ?yg, .251 N. Y. 127, 167 N. E. 194 (1929).
The constitationality of such a provision as § 29 of the instant statute
has never before been passed upon by a court of final appeal Cf. Travel-
ers' Ins. Co. v. Post, 128 Misc. 626 (Municipal Ct. 1927), appeal denied, 222
N. Y. Supp. 913 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1927); WIS. STAT. (1927) § 102. 29
(3). In the present case judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed on the
ground that, since the insurance carrier was $1,000 poorer by reason of the
defendant's negligent act, the legislature acted within its powers in placing
this loss upon the wrongdoer. The dissent argues that the statute amounts
to taking property without due process of law in that, having paid for all
damages caused by its negligent act, the defendant is now forced to pay
for losses arising out of the operation of industry-lonses which do not
concern it as wrongdoer. See dissent in instant ease, supra at 198. The
two $500 payments exacted from the employer have been sustained on two
grounds: (1) that the payments were less than he would have had to
make had dependents claimed, and (2) that he could justly be made to pay
an occupation tax covering the risk of injuries necessarily occurring to
employees in his industry. Sheehan Co. v. Shuler, 265 U. S. 371,'44
Sup. Ct. 548 (1923). Obviously, neither of these reasons is applicable to
the present situation. The arbitrary nature of the payment with respect
to this defendant is partly revealed when it is considered that had the
widow claimed against the insurance carrier under the Compensation Law,
the present defendant, though still paying full damages, -would have paid
$1,000 less, since the $1,000 payment could not have been exacted from
the employer's insurance carrier. See (1929) 29 CoL. L. REv. 1011. It
may also be said that, in general, it is easier for the employer than for the
third party to insure himself against such additional loss. Finally, since
this statute imposes the penalty only upon those tortfeasors who (1) kill
(2) an employee (3) covered by the Workmen's Compensation Law (4)
during the course of his employment, and (5) where no claim is made by
dependents, it is urged that this places the defendant in an unjust and arbi-
trary classification, without reference to damage done or occupation pur-
sued, and is therefore unconstitutional. Cf. People v. Beakcs Dairy Co.,
222 N. Y. 416, 429, 119 N. E. 115, 119 (1918).
CONTRACTS-PROMISOR'S OFTIONS-PROMISE TO PURCHASE ALL REqumE-
MENTS OF CONTEMPLATED BUSINESS-The defendant wholesale ice company
and the plaintiff coal company contracted that the former should for a
certain period furnish the latter with all the ice it might sell up to one
hundred tons daily. At the time of contracting, the plaintiff had no estab-
lished business in ice but contemplated entering such business. The defend-
ant later repudiated the contract and the plaintiff brought suit for damages.
The lower court gave judgment for the plaintiff. Held, on appeal, that the
contract was void for lack of mutuality, since the plaintiff had no "actual
requirements" for ice. Judgment reversed. Nassau Supply Co. v. leo
Service Co., 234 N. Y. Supp. 656 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1929).
A promise to purchase all of one's requirements of a certain commodity
is sufficient consideration for the return promise of the vendor to sell. 1
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1st ed. 1920) § 140; Corbin, The Effect of Option
on Consideration (1925) 34 YAL L. J. 570, 531; Patterson, Illusory Prom-
ises and Promisors' Options (1920) 6 IowA L. BULL. 209, 224. But some-
thing more than the satisfaction of formal consideration seems required
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to meet the defense of "lack of mutuality." Where the prospective demand
of the vendee is fairly stable, as in the case of business consumers or manu-
facturers, the contract is usually held enforceable. Rosenthal v. Empire
Brick and Supply Co., 123 App. Div. 503, 108 N. Y. Supp. 347 (1st Dep't
1908); Marx v. American Malting Co., 169 Fed. 582 (C. C. A. 6th, 1909);
Scott v. Stevenson Co., 130 Minn. 151, 153 N. W. 316 (1915). But where
the prospective demand is very elastic, as where the buyer is a jobber or
dealer, there seems to be considerable difference of opinion as to the validity
of the agreement. Cf. Crane v. Crane, 105 Fed. 869 (C. C. A. 7th, 1901)
(agreement said to be unenforceable where seller agreed to furnish all the
dock-oak lumber the buyers would require for their trade in the Chicago
market for a certain year); Ehrenworth v. Stuhmer, 229 N. Y. 210, 128
N. E. 108 (1920) (agreement held enforceable where defendant agreed to
sell all the bread the plaintiff would require upon his route). See Note
(1927) 27 COL. L. REV. 178. The courts, in interpreting the quantity term of
the contract, seem to fear that "requirements" may set no definite limit
on the amount that may be ordered, thus leaving the seller at the mercy
of the buyer who orders an exhorbitant amount. But the term "require-
ment," while not restricted to average needs over a prior period, is subject
to a maximum limitation gauged by reasonable expectations. .E. G. Dailey
Co. v. Clark Can Co., 128 Mich. 591, 87 N. W. 761 (1901); N. Y. Central
Iron Works Co. v. United States Radiator Co., 174 N. Y. 331, 66 N. E.
967 (1903). But cf. Jenkins and Co. v. Anaheim Sugar Co., 247 Fed. 958
(C. C. A. 9th, 1918). In many cases where such agreements have been
declared to be unenforceable, the buyer had already received all to which he
was reasonably entitled and was trying to recover for failure to fill excessive
orders. Cf. Crane v. Crane, supra; Schl, gel Mfg. Co. v. Cooper's Glue Fac-
tory, 231 N. Y. 459, 132 N. E. 148 (1921). Under facts similar to those in
the instant case, recovery has been allowed. Texas Co. v. Pensacola Mari-
time Corp., 279 Fed. 19 (C. C. A. 5th, 1922) (ship-coal dealer extending
business to sale of bunker oil; express maximum limit set on amount that
might be ordered). But cf. American Trading Co. v. National Fibre and
Insul. Co., 31 Del. 258, 114 Atl. 67 (1921) (recovery denied where pur-
chaser ordered excessive amount, no limit being set in the contract). The
decisions in these cases seem to depend on the limitation of the buyer's
requirements. In the instant case, the actual needs of a contemplated ice
business and the fixed makimum should have provided a sufficient limitation.
EVEDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY OF STATEMENTS TO PHYSICIAN AS BASIS roR
PHYSICIAN'S OPINION.-The plaintiff brought an action to recover for in-
juries suffered while riding in one of the defendant's cabs. Over the de-
fendant's objection the trial court permitted a physician to read a history
of the case, consisting of statements made to him by the plaintiff regarding
the accident, her past suffering, and her present condition. The statements
were made at a consultation post litem motam, solely to qualify the physi-
cian as an expert witness. The plaintiff contended that the evidence was
admissible as a basis for the physician's opinion. The trial court gave
judgment for the plaintiff. Held, on appeal (two justices dissenting), that
the statements to the physician were erroneously admitted, but were not
sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal. Reid v. Yellow Cab Co., 279
Pac. 635 (Ore. 1929).
There is a distinction, not always recognized, between the admission of
statements by a patient to a physician to prove the truth of the matter,
their admission to show the basis of the physician's opinion, and admission
of the opinion itself. 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (1923) § 688; 3 ibid. § 1720.
Where the statements are of present pains and symptoms, made with a
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view to obtaining treatment, they are admissible under an exception to the
hearsay rule, on the theory that a patient seeling treatment vill not
falsify. Shearer v. Aurora E. & C. R. R., 200 IIl. App. 225 (1916); sea
Shaughnessy v. Holt, 236 Ill. 485, 86 NT. E. 256 (1908); (1926) 13 VA. L.
REv. 133. But where the statements are made merely to qualify the phy-
sician as an expert witness, the reason for credibility is absent and the
statements are usually excluded. Consolidatcd Traction Co. v. Lambert-
son, 60 N. J. L. 452, 38 AtL 683 (1897); Shaughnessty v. Holt, supra; Note
(1908)' 21 L. R. A. (N. s.) 826. A competent physician's opinion, based
on the patient's relation of his case history and on an examination for
the purpose of treatment, is generally admissible. Flcasher v. Cardion
Pack. Co., 93 Wash. 48,160 Pac. 14 (1916); Ft. Smith & TV. Ry. v. Hutch-
inson, 71 Okla. 139, 175 Pac. 922 (1918). But where the opinion is basd
entirely on the patient's statements it is inadmissible. Grand Trunk Pac. Ry.
v. Tollard, 286 Fed. 676 (C. C. A. 8th, 1923); (1919) 29 YArzL L. 3. 232.
Where the opinion is admitted, and the above three-fold distinction recog-
nized, the courts will admit the patient's statement of his case history as
a basis for the expert opinion. Cronin v. Fitchburg Ry., 181 Mass. 202, 63
N. E. 335 (1902); Johnson v. Electric Co., 125 Me. 88, 131 Atl. 1 (1925);
Lowery v. Jones, 121 So. 704 (Ala. 1929). In the instant case the court
regarded the history of the case, as related by the plaintiff to the physician,
as incompetent because it was given at a consultation post litem fiotam,
and merely to qualify the physician as a witness. For these reasons the
opinion itself might have been excluded. Hinz v. Wagner, 25 N. D. 110,
140 N. W. 729 (1913); Texas & N. 0. R. R. v. Steplums, 198 S. W. 396
(Tex. 1917). Contra: Chicago Ry. v. Jackson, 63 Okla. 32, 162 Pac. 823
(1917). But once the opinion was admitted, the statements of the plaintiff,
so far as they were relevant, might be admissible to show the basis of the
opinion, even though not admissible as proof of their truth. 3 WIGMxonE, op.
cit. supra § 1720.
INSURANCE-APPUCANT'S MISSTATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACT-REQUIDE-
DIENT THAT MISREPRESENTATION BE FRAUDULENT TO CONsTru=E DEFENSE.-
An applicant for a life insurance policy, when questioned by the company's
medical examiner concerning previous illness and medical attention, replied
"Nothing except that you know of, doctor." The examiner wrote "None"
on the application, although the applicant had been treated by him several
times. In an action on the policy, the lower court instructed the jury that,
in the absence of fraud, a material misrepresentation in the application
would not preclude a finding for the plaintiff. A verdict was returned
for the plaintiff. Held, on appeal, that the judgment be affirmed. Kuihns v.
N. Y. Life Insurance Co., 147 Atl. 76 (Pa. 1929).
It has long been held that any misstatement of a material fact in the
application, whether innocently or fraudulently made, will avoid the policy.
Campbell v. New England Mutual Life Insurance Co., 98 Mass. 381 (1867) ;
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Feezko, 26 Ohio App. 287, 159 N. E.
486 (1927); VANCE, INSURANCE (1904) 267; 3 COOLEY, BRIEFS ON INsUR-
ANCE (2d ed. 1927) 1904, 1911. This rule is based on the theory that the
insurer is entitled to know all the essential facts which may influence him
in estimating the contemplated risk. See Murphy v. Pnidential Insurance
Co., 205 Pa. 444, 454, 55 Atl. 19, 23 (1903); Kasprzy: v. Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co., 79 Misc. 263, 267, 140 N. Y. Supp. 211, 214 (Sup. Ct. 1913).
Thus it would seem superfluous in cases of the instant type to attempt to
classify a material misstatement as a "representation" or a "warranty,"
as does the court in the instant case. See Lewis v. N. Y. Life Insuranco
Co.. 201 Mo. App. 48, 60, 209 S. W. 625, 629 (1919). Recently, however,
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several courts have stated that a misrepresentation in an insurance appli-
cation, as distinguished from a warranty, must be fraudulent as well as
material in order to constitute a valid defense to an action on the policy.
See Lieberman v. American Bonding and Casualty Go., 244 S. W. 102, 104
(Mo. App. 1922) ; Livingood v. N. Y. Life Insurance Go., 287 Pa. 128, 131,
134 Atl. 474, 475 (1926); Campbell v. Business Men's Assurance Co., 31 F.
(2d) 571, 573 (W. D. Mo. 1928). These statements, in emphasizing the
moral eligibility of the policy-holder or those claiming under him, seem
to overlook the practical justification of the established rule. Some can
be accounted for as careless explanations of obvious decisions. Cf. Lieber-
man v. American Bonding and Casualty Co., supra (facts constitute estop-
pel to set up misrepresentation as defense) ; Clayton v. Assurance Corpora-
tion, 104 N. J. L. 364, 140 Atl. 307 (1928) (misrepresentation 14ot material).
Many seem predicated on a particular fact set-up, wherein the alleged
"misrepresentation" dealt with the health of a policy applicant who at the
time was suffering from a latent disease which had not yet made itself
apparent by external symptoms. Cf. Livingood v. N. Y. Life Insurance
Co., swpra; Northwedtern. Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Wiggins" 15 F.
(2d) 646 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926). Decisions of the latter sort might more
wisely be justified on the ground of the practical "truth" of the applicant's
statement, than by the application of the broader generalization requiring
fraud as a defense. Cf. Moulor v. Insurance Co., 111 U. S. 335, 345, 4
Sup. Ct. 466, 471 (1884). Its application in the instant case was un-
necessary, inasmuch as the facts seem clearly to point to an estoppel of
the defendant to set up the defence of misrepresentation. Cf. Suravitz
v. Prudential Insurance Co., 244 Pa. 582, 91 Atl. 495 (1914). Moreover,
of the cases cited to support the rule in the instant case, one makes the
statement as pure dictum, one actually bases its decision on estoppel, and
one comes under the "latent" disease category suggested above. See cases
cited in instant opinion, supra at 77. The danger of the rule, as thus
indicated, lies in the possibility of its being followed in cases where the
facts would not justify the resultant decision, so that obvious injustice
would be done the insurance companies, the cost of which would ultimately
be imposed on the innocent policy-holders. Cf. Price, How Far Does the
Knowledge of an Agent Affect the Defen.ce of Fraud in an Action on a Life
Insurance Policy (1924) 19 ILL. L. REV. 377, 389.
INSURANCE-RESPONSIBILITY OF INSURER FOR NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO SET-
TLE.-The plaintiff city, which operated a bus line, carried liability insur-
ance of $10,000 with the defendant company. The policy required the
insurer to defend all actions brought under it, unless it elected to settle,
and it was to have exclusive charge of the defense. A man injured by
one of the plaintiff's busses brought suit against the city. Before the
trial he offered to settle for $4,325. The defendant company refused, and
a judgment for over $15,000 was rendered against the insured, of which
the company paid $10,000 and the insured the balance. The latter sued
the insurer for the amount he had paid. The lower court allowed a recovery
on the theory that the defendant had acted unreasonably in refusing to
settle. Held, on appeal, that the judgment be reversed. City of Wakefield
v. Globe Indemnity Co., 225 N. W. 643 (Mich. 1929).
The insurer is not bound under the contract to save the insured harmless
by settling, if possible, at any price up to the policy limit. Kingan & Co. V.
Maryland Cas. Co., 65 Ind. App. 301, 115 N. E. 348 (1917). But where
the insurer is guilty of "bad faith" in refusing to settle it is responsible
for the excess. Brown & McCabe v. London Guarantee & Accident Co.,
232 Fed. 298 (D. Ore. 1915) ; Note (1925) 34 A. L. R. 750. Where, as in
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the instant case, the insurer is charged with negligence in not settling,
the cases are in conflict. The instant decision is supported by the follow-
ing authorities: Wisconsin Zinc Co. v. Fidelity & Dep7osit Co. of Md, 162
Wis. 39, 155 N. W. 1081 (1916) ; Best Bldg. Co. v. Employers' Liab. Asaur.
Corp., 247 N. Y. 451, 160 N. E. 911 (1928); see Wynnewood Lumber Co. v.
Travelers' Ins. Co., 173 N. C. 269, 271, 91 S. E. 946, 947 (1917). Contva:
Douglas v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 81 N. If. 371, 127 AtM 708 (1924);
Stowers Furn. Co. v. Am. Indemnity Co., 15 S. W. (2d) 544 (Tem. 1929);
Attleboro Mfg. Co. v. Frankfort Marine Ins. Co., 240 Fed. 573 (C. C. A.
1st, 1917) semble; see Note (1926) 24 MICH. L. Rnv. 173. The "due care"
rule has been attacked as too uncertain a test. Best v. Employers' Liab.
Corp., supra. But a rule imposing liability on the insurance company for
not settling when a reasonably prudent man without insuraice would have
settled seems susceptible of application at least as satisfactory as the "good
faith" test. Cf. Auerbach v.- Maryland Cas. Co., 236 N. Y. 247, 140 N. E.
577 (1923) (finding no bad faith where insurer admitted the offer to be
good, but refused to settle unless insured shared the cost) ; Brown & Mc-
Cabe v. London Guarantee Co., supra (finding bad faith on similar facts);
see Comment (1923) 8 MINN. LAW REV. 151.
INTERNATIONAL LAw-WA--CONTRATUAL RIGHTS OF U. S. CITIZEN
TAKING ASSIGNMENT FROM GEamAN Ars DECLARATION 0F WAR BUT PRO
TO RETROACTIVE FRENCH SEQuEsTRATION STATUTE.-The plaintiff, a New
York corporation, sued L'Urbaine Co. of France for commissions due under
a contract made in 1913 between the defendant and the plaintiff's assign-
ors, Scharnberg & Co., a German partnership. Under that agreement, in
return for their already completed services in procuring an American
agent for L'Urbaine Co., Scharnberg & Co. had become entitled to com-
missions on premiums tp be collected in the United States during the ensu-
ing fifteen years. Scharnberg & Co. assigned for value all their interest
under the contract to the plaintiff after the declaration of war between
France and Germany, but before the enactment of a French statute which
appeared to forbid, inter alia, the performance for the benefit of the enemy
of contracts entered into by French and German citizens prior to the
declaration of war. This decree was declared to be operative from the
day following the declaration of war. The commissions accruing between
1914 and 1921 were sequestrated by the French government. The present
action was brought to recover out of the defendant's American assets com-
missions due subsequently to 1921. The Appellate Division held the French
statute to be a good defense. Frenkel & Co. ,. L'Urbaine Fire Ins. Co.,
222 App. Div. 299, 226 N. Y. Supp. 322 (1st Dep't 1928). Held, on appeal,
that the judgment be reversed. Frenkel & Co. v. L'Urbaine Fire Ins. Co.,
251 N. Y. 243 (1929).
The issue presented is whether retroactive nullification in France of Ger-
man contract rights which had been assigned to an American will be en-
forced in an American court. The court interprets the French statute as be-
ing designed merely to suspend performance of pre-war agreements made in
favor of the enemy. But it further indicates that even were the purpose
of the statute to abrogate completely pre-war contracts between French
and German citizens, no principle of comity would require it to enforce
these confiscatory provisions against a United States citizen. Under mod-
ern theory, the private property of enemy nationals is not subject to con-
fiscation. 2 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW (3d ed. 1921) § 102. In
view of this, the interpretation by the court of the French statute appeam
r.asonable. On the other hand, some authorities appear to hold that agree-
ments are completely abrogated by war itself or by regulatory statutes.
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But the cases purporting to support this view appear to deal only with
executory contracts the post-war revival of which seems inequitable in view
of the unforeseen interval. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Statham, 93 U. S. 24
(1875); Isaacs v. McGrath, 1 Nott & McC. 563 (S. C. 1819); Metropolitan
Water Board v. Dick, Kerr & Co., [1917] 2 K. B. 1. Where one party to
a contract has fully performed and it remains only for the other party
to pay money, the remedy generally has been held to revive at the close
of hostilities. Spencer v. Brower & Co., 32 Tex. 663 (1870) ; see Watts,
Watts & Co. v. Uneone Austriaca di Navigazione, 224 Fed. 188, 192 (E. D.
N. Y. 1915); 7 MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST (1906) § 1139; FAU-
CHILLE, TRAITE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (8th ed. 1921) tome 2, §
1057. The defendant in the instant case relied on the holding in Schrijvcr
v. Sutherland, 18 F. (2d) 688 (Ct. of App. D. C. 1927), cert. denied, 275
U. S. 546, 48 Sup. Ct. 84 (1927). In that case a bill for recognition as share-
holders was brought by citizens of Holland who had purchased shares in
an American railroad from a German citizen in Amsterdam after declara-
tion of war between the United States and Germany, but months prior to
the passage of the Trading with the Enemy Act [40 STAT. 411 (1917) ].
The Hollanders' claim was denied on the basis of that act. The result
seems unfortunate. See (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 1161. In the instant case,
the contractual rights of a United States citizen were threatened by a
similarly retroactive French decree. The decision is significant as indicat-
ing the readiness of an American court to deny effect to a foreign statute
when rights which an American citizen acquired by a prior assignment
are endangered.
INTERPLEADER-ALLOWANCE OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO COMPLAINANT.-Tho
defendant Brown contracted to erect a building for the complainant for
a stated price. After receiving a part of the agreed compensation Brown
was forced by financial troubles to abandon the work, leaving various ma-
terialmen unpaid. The complainant thereupon finished the construction
himself at a cost which left in his hands a considerable balance from the
amount which he had agreed to pay Brown for full performance. The
defendant materialmen having brought suit and filed claims for payment,
the complainant deposited this balance in court, praying that the defend-
ants be required to interplead their claims, and that he be granted his
costs and reasonable attorney's fees. A final decree was granted in com-
pliance with the complainant's prayer. Held, on appeal, that the decree
be reversed as to the allowance of attorney's fees, on the ground that the
complainant had sought the decree for his own protection, but that in all
other respects the decree be affirmed. Brown v. Marsh, 123 So. 762 (Fla.
1929).
Where an action of interpleader is brought properly and in good faith,
the complainant will, on timely application, be allowed his costs, from the
fund if there be one, and in any case at the eventual expense of the losing
claimant. Supreme Council L. C. B. A. v. Scherer, 174 Mich. 25, 140 N.
W. 505 (1913) ; Farley v. Blood, 30 N. H. 354 (1854); MACLENNAN, INTER-
PLEADER (1901) c. 13. Most jurisdictions also allow reasonable attorney's
fees where the complainant has no pecuniary interest in the result. Terry
v. Supreme Farest, Woodman. Circle, 21 F. (2d) 158 (D. Tenn. 1926);
Beilharz v. Illingsworth, 62 Tex. Civ. App. 647, 132 S. W. 106 (1910) (facts
almost identical with the instant case) ; Pettus v. Hendricks, 113 Va. 326,
74 S. E. 191 (1912). In a few states statutes expressly provide for such
allowance. ALA. 6ODE (Michie, 1928) § 10390;p CONN. GEN. STAT. (1918)
§ 6055. A minority of jurisdictions refuse in all situations to grant at-
torney's fees for lack of specific statutory authority. Los Angeles Trust
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& Savings Bank v. Ward, 197 Cal. 103, 239 Pac. 847 (1925) ; Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. v. Kinsley, 269 Ill. 529, 109 N. E. 1011 (1915). Louisiana ap-
plies this rule to the action of concoursus, which approximates that of inter-
pleader. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Dorsett, 152 La. 67, 92 So. "/37 (1922).
Where the complainant has even an indirect pecuniary interest in the final
disposition of the property attorney's fees will probably be denied. Grores
v. Sentell, 153 U. S. 465, 14 Sup. Ct. 898 (1894) (complainant a member
of a firm which was practically a claimant of the fund); cf. Dunlap v.
Whitmer, 137 La. 792, 69 So. 189 (1915); N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Dorsett,
supra. It would seem, however, that an interest which will bar a recovery
of attorney's fees must be something more than the complainant's desire
to protect himself from further litigation by having the conflicting claims
quieted; for such an "interest" will exist in every case of interpleader.
4 PommROy, EQurY JunxsrxinNcn (4th ed. 1919) § 1320. On this ground
the instant decision seems questionable.
LAIoNDLoD AND TENANT-WHAT CONSTITUTES A SUFFICIENT HOLDING OVIn
To CREATE A NEw TE.---The defendant was lessee of the plaintiff for a
term of five years. After the expiration of the term, the lessee left personal
property on the premises for seven months for the purpose of aiding a
renting agent in leasing the premises, under an agreement with the agent
whereby the defendant was to pay rent while the property remaindd on
the land. This was done with the knowledge of the plaintiff, but apparently
without his authority. The plaintiff sued for a semi-annual installment of
the rent, alleging that such a holding-over operated to renew the lease.
Held, that the tenant was not responsible for a new term. Sargent v. Recd,
147 Atl. 148 (Maine 1929).
Where a tenant holds over after the expiration of the term, the landlord
may, at his election, treat the tenant as a trespasser or as a tenant for
a new term created by operation of law. 2 TIFFANY, LANDLORD Arm TEN-
ANT (1912) § 209. The leaving of property on the premises. being a partial
failure to redeliver possession, may constitute such a holding over as to result
in a renewal of the lease. Byxbee v. Blake, 74 Conn. 607, 51 At. 535 (1902).
This is so even though the tenant has notified the landlord that he will
not use the premises for an additional term. Cavanaugh v. Clinchl, 88 Ga.
610, 15 S. E. 673 (1891). But where the property is abandoned and worth-
less, there is not such a holding over as to create a new term. Brennan v.
New York, 80 App. Div. 251, 80 N. Y. Supp. 247 (2d Dep't 1903) (worthlezs
stoves). And it has been held that there was no holding over where furni-
ture was left during the winter on premises used solely as a summer resi-
dence. Orville Realty Co. v. Wanick, 113 Misc. 34G, 184 N. Y. Supp. 641
(1st Dep't 1920). The creation of a new term is not prevented by the fact
that the holding over was due to a mistake as to the date of 'termination
of the lease. Adams v. Dunn, 64 Pa. Super. Ct. 303 (191G). Nor by the
fact that failure to redeliver possession was due to unforeseen difficulties.
Sullivan v. Ringler & Co., 59 App. Div. 184, 69 N. Y. Supp. 38 (2d Dep't
1901) (tenant forced to take legal action in order to remove the sub-tenant).
But some courts have held that the lease is not renewed where the holding
over -is due to quarantine. Herter v. Mullen, 159 N. Y. 28, 53 N. E.
700 (1899). But ef. Mason v. Wierengo's Estate, 113 Mich. 151, 71 N. W.
489 (1897) (tenant unable to remove goods because of serious illness).
And a holding over under a new agreement between the landlord and ten-
ant does not operate to renew the term. Landsbcrg v. Tivoli Brewing Co.,
132 Mich. 651, 94 N. W. 197 (1903). In the instant case there was no
showing that the renting agent was the agent of the plaintiff for the pur-
pose of entering into a new agreement. Yet the court held this to be im-
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material and quite properly rested its decision on the fact that the plaintiff
had knowledge of the new agreement and had acquiesced therein.
LIBEL AND SLANDER-ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE OF CLERK IN CIVIL SERVICE TO
REPORT ANOTHER CLERK TO SUPERIOR OFFIcER.-The plaintiff was chief
clerk in a United States engineering office. The defendant, a subordinate
clerk, addressed letters to a superior officer charging that the plaintiff was
derelict in the performance of his duties. A statute provided: " . . . a
privileged publication is one made . . . in any legislative or judicial
proceeding, or in any other official proceeding authorized by law. . . .
CAL. CIV. CODE (Deering, 1923) § 47. Subsequent provisions of the same
section indicated that this privilege was to be absolute. The trial court
held the communication absolutely privileged, and declined to hear evidence
of malice offered by the plaintiff. Held, on appeal, that the judgment be
affirmed. Layne v. Kirby, 278 Pac. 1046 (Cal. D. C. App. 1929).
Even in the absence of statute, the statements of judges, parties, counsel,
and witnesses during the course of regular judicial proceedings are abso-
lutely privileged. McDavitt v. Boyer, 169 Ill. 475, 48 N. E. 317 (1897);
Youmans v. Smith, 153 N. Y. 214, 47 N. E. 265 (1897); Laing v. MAitten,
185 Mass. 233, 70 N. E. 128 (1904). But the preliminary complaint to a
proper officer in regard to a crime is only conditionally privileged. Butler
v. Freyjman, 216 Mo. App. 636, 260 S. W. 523 (1924),; Elms v. Crane, 118
Me. 261, 107 AtI. 852 (1919) ; Pecue v. West, 233 N. Y. 316, 135 N. E. 515
(1922); Hathaway v. Bruggink, 168 Wis. 390, 170 N. W. 244. Contra:
Hott v. Yarbrough, 245 S. W. 676 (Tex. 1922) (perhaps distinguishable as
letter to foreman of grand jury). And a communication concerning a
public officer made to his superior is not absolutely privileged. White V.
Nicholls, 3 How. 266 (U. S. 1845) (letter to President in regard to customs
collector) ; Sweeney v. Higgins, 117 Me. 415, 104 At. 791 (1918) (by alder-
man to mayor concerning police officer); Bingham v. Gaynor, 203 N. Y. 27,
96 N. E. 84 (1912) (letter to mayor concerning police commissioner). The
apparent purpose of the provision "any other official proceeding authorized
by law" in the instant statute is to obliterate the old distinction between
judicial and administrative proceedings upon which many of the decisions
have turned, and with reference to which they have been termed "hope-
lessly irreconcilable." (1928) 41 HARv. L. REV. 403. The problem remains,
however, as to when there is an "official proceeding" which shall be included
within the realm of absolute privilege. Had the defendant in the instant
case been under a legal duty to make such a disclosure, the communication
would clearly have been absolutely privileged. Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.
S. 483 (1895) ; DeArnaud v. Ainsworth, 24 App. D. C. 167 (1904). Whether
he was under a moral or social duty is of no importance, for such a duty
gives rise at most to a conditional privilege, which can be defeated by
proof of actual malice. Rosenbaum v. Roche, 46 Tex. Civ. App. 237, 101
S. W. 1164 (1907). The cases relied on by the court in the instant case
may be distinguished in that, although some of the defendants were under
no legal duty, the communications alleged to be libellous were all in a form
specifically authorized by statute. Harris v. Huntington, 2 Tyler 129 (Vt.
1802) (petition to General Assembly as authorized by state constitution);
Duncan v. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry., 72 Fed. 808 (C. C. A. 9th, 1896) (plea
before Interstate Commerce Commission in answer to charges by plaintiff);
Burgess v. Turle & Co., 155 Minn. 479, 193 N. W. 945 (1923) (statute re-
quired defendant to state default of plaintiff, in notice of cancellation of
land contract); Larkin v. Noonan, 19 Wis. 82 (1865) (citizen addressed
authorized petition to governor concerning sheriff). The general tendency
of the decisions is to restrict the scope of absolute privilege. ODGERS,
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DIGmsT or LAw OF SLANDEB AND (5th ed. 1911) 230, 231; see An'drowo
v. Gardiner, 224 N. Y. 440, 448, 121 N. E. 341, 344 (1918). Oldahomn,
with an essentially identical statute, has refused to exend absolute im-
munity even to an affidavit delivered to the Department of Justice for uro by
a Senate Committee. Tuohy v. Halsell, 35 Ola. 61, 12 Pac. 126 (1912).
A rule permitting one civil service employee to communicate lib llous state-
ments concerning another to a superior officer, without requiring good faith
and absence of malice as a condition to immunity, seems decidedly ques-
tionable.
MALicious PRosEcuIoN-ENTrY OF NOL=n P-OSQUI AS SUr'CIcrT
TERSIMNATION OF CRII!NAL PROCEEDINGS To GnouND Crvm AcrxoN-Tho
plaintiff alleged that the defendant maliciously and without probable cause
had procured his indictment for larceny, and that without his Imowledgo
or consent the assistant district attorney had entered a no/ll proxqui
The defendant's demurrer was sustained. Hed on appeal, that the com-
plaint must show that the plaintiff was acquitted, and that a tmoilo proacqui
entered by a district attorney is not such a termination of the criminal
proceedings as is sufficient to support a civil action for malicious prozecu-
tion. Judgment affirmed. MacLean v. Naumlxag Trust Co., 167 N. E.
748 (Mass. 1929).
In an action for malicious prosecution, it is necezsary to show that the
criminal prosecution on which the action is based has been terminated in
favor of the accused, since it will not otherwise sufficiently appear that the
original proceeding was unfounded or unjust. See Robbins v. Robbins, 133
N. Y. 597, 599, 30 N. E. 977, 978 (1872). A settlement or compromise
between the parties is not a sufficient termination. Craig v. Ginn, 3 Penn.
117, 48 AtL 192 (Del. 1901). But of. Leo v. Jones, 44 R. L 151, 116 AL
201 (1922). A determination of the criminal action in favor of the accused
with the effect of preventing any further proceedings in the same action is
generally held sufficient. Milar v. Solitt, 131 Ill. App. 196 (1907) (dis-
charge on habeas corpus); Hobbs v. Ill. Cent. R. R., 182 Iowa 316, 165 N.
IV. 912 (1917) (voluntary dismissal by prosecutor); Wilkison v. McGee,
265 Mo. 574, 178 S. W. 471 (1915) (indictment quashed); Weisnr v. Han-
sen, 81 N. J. L. 601, 80 AtI. 455 (1911) (failure of grant jury to indict);
Harrelson v. Johnson, 119 S. C. 59, 111 S. E. 882 (1922) (discharge by mag-
istrate). The entry of a nolle prosequi prevents any further proceedings in
the same action. Commonwealth v. McClusky, 151 Mass. 488, 25 N. E. 72
(1890). But it is not a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same cause.
Lan bert v. Sandford, 2 Blackf. 137 (Ind. 1828). It is generally held to be a
sufficient termination to sustain a civil action for malicious prosecution.
McLaughlin v. Lehigh Valley R. R., 93 N. J. L. 263, 108 Atl. 309 (1919);
Meraz v. Valencia, 28 N. M. 174, 210 Pac. 225 (1922); Stancill v. Under-
wood, 188 N. C. 475, 124 S. E. 845 (1924); Pierce Oil Corp. v. Mitchcll,
.99 Okla. 148, 225 Pac. 937 (1923); Schdbler v. Steinburg, 129 Tenn. 614,
167 S. W. 866 (1914). A dictum in an early Massachusetts case, however,
laid down a contrary rule. See Bacon v. Towne, 4 Cush. 217, 235 (Masm.
1849). And this dictum has been followed by subsequent decisions in that
state. Parker v. Farley, 10 Cush. 279 (Mass. 1852) (contains dicta to the
effect that a contrary rule might be more desirable); Brown v. Laixinan,
12 Cush. 482 (Mass. 1853); Fogg v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 167 N.
E. 251 (Mass. 1929);; of. Langford v. Boston & A. R. R., 144 Mass. 431
(1887) (entry of nolle prosequi procured by accused held not sufficient).
But cf. Graves v. Dawson, 133 Mass. 419 (1882) (discharge by court fol-
lowed by entry of nolle prosequi by district attorney held sufficient). Where
a palty has been indicted by a grand jury, bound over for trial, and then
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-released by the entry of a nolle prosequi, which deprives him of an oppor-
tunity to clear himself in open court, -he has suffered humiliation, expense,
loss of time and possibly actual imprisonment. Since the entry of a nollo
prosequi definitely terminates all proceedings in the criminal action without
a new indictment and is an apparent admission by the prosecution that the
action is not well founded, it is submitted that the criminal proceedings
have been sufficiently terminated in favor of the accused to fulfill the re-
quirement for a civil action for malicious prosecution.
MONOPOLIES-PATENTS--CROSs LICENSE AGREEMENTS AND TIIE ANTI-
TRUST LAw--The federal government sought to enjoin the defendants, who
produce over 80% of all cracked gasoline refined in the United States, from
violating the Sherman Act. The charge was based on certain cross-license
agreements, the ostensible purpose of which was to permit the common
use of various patented processes by all the defendants. Some of these
agreements in addition fixed the royalties to be charged to sub-licensees
and provided for their division among the defendants. Others provided
that the defendants refrain from contesting patents which might be issued
in the future. Several of the agreements were not restricted to gasoline
produced under any of the patented processes. The contention of the
defense was that the grant of a patent in itself creates a lawful monopoly,
that the cross-license agreements were entered into in good faith to prevent
patent infringement suits, and that no matter what their conditions may be,
they promote rather than restrict competition. The petitioner showed that
the patents involved were not basic or pioneer, but covered improvements
only, that none of them actually infringed on each other, and that after
the execution of the license agreements none of the defendants adopted
the others' processes. Held, on appeal by the petitioner from the report
of the special master (one judge dissenting), that since the cross-license
agreements included more than was necessary to protect the patents, they
were within the scope of the Sherman Act, and that insofar as their effect
was to fix prices, they tended to eliminate competition and were invalid.
United States v. Standard Oil (Indiana), 33 F. (2d) 617 (N. D. Ill. 1929).
The legality of cross-license agreements has not yet been considered by
the United States Supreme Court. See Motion Picture Patents Inc. v.
Universal Film Co., 243 U. S. 502, 521, 37 Sup. Ct. 416, 422 (1917);
Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U. S. 70, 94, 22 Sup. Ct. 747, 757
(1902). It has been predicted that such a pooling of patents by itself,
even where a monopoly results in the line of trade in which the patents
are essential, will not be held unlawful. Lamb, Relation of Patent Law
to Anti-Trust Laws (1927) 12 CORN. L. Q. 261; Comment (1928) 38 YALE
L. J. 246. But the agreements in the instant case involve in addition sev-
eral practices which the Supreme Court has in the past refused to allow.
Pope v. Gormully, 144 U. S. 224, 12 Sup. Ct. 637 (1892) (covenants not
to attack the validity of future patents) ; Standard Sanitary Mfg. Go. V,.
United States, 226 U. S. 20, 33 Sup. Ct. 9 (1912) (division of royalties) ;
Motion Picture Patents v. Universal Film Go., supra (conditions imposed on
licensees involving unpatented articles) ; United States v. Trenton Potticals,
273 U. S. 392, 47 Sup. Ct' 227 (1927) (price fixing). And where any type of
agreement results in a combination that substantially controls the trade, the
Court will be especially stringent in passing upon it. See Straus v. Amer.
Pub. Ass'n, 231 U. S. 222, 235, 34 Sup. Ct. 84, 87 (1913). It has also been
emphatically pointed out by the Supreme Court that evasion of the anti-
trust laws by resort to any disguise or subterfuge of form will not be
sanctioned. See United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. 106, 181,
31 Sup. Ct. 632, 649 (1911). The fact that an agreement concerns a
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patented article does not grant any immunity where the monopolistic prac-
tice goes further than is necessary to protect the patent rights. Boston
Store r. American Gramophone Co., 246 U. S. 8, 38 Sup. Ct. 257 (1918);
Note (1924) 24 CoL. L. REv. 654. Hence, there seems to be no reason to
doubt that cross-license agreements, when accompanied by such restrictions
as appear in the instant case, will be prohibited by the Supreme Court.
ACrIca--ATACK ON VALIDITY OF ATTACu NT3---E=- cr oF RECO=Y
OF ATTACHED PRoPEmRy BY GIVING BomN.-The plaintiff lessor attached
personal property of his lessee on the ground that the latter was removing
his property from the state before his lease had expired with intent to
defraud him of rent not yet due. The defendant's motion to vacate the
attachment on the ground, inter alia, that the complaint failed to state a
cause of action was denied. While his appeal from this motion was pend-
ing, he replevied his property and as security gave the plaintiff a bond
conditioned upon the defendant paying any judgment which might be
rendered against him. Held, (one justice dissenting), that the defendant
was not precluded by having given the bond from urging on appeal his
motion to vacate. Skalowski v. Joe Fisher Inc., 149 S. E. 340 (S. C. 1929).
Mlost state codes provide that attached property may be recovered either
by giving a judgment bond, conditioned on the defendant satisfying the
judgment, or a forthcoming bond, conditioned on the defendant re-delivering
the attached property at the order of the court, or paying its value. ILL.
REv. STAT. (Cahill, 1927) c. 11, par. 14, 15; IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1926)
§§ 996, 999; OHiO GEN. CODE (Page, 1926) H 11827, 11844. Where the
latter form of bond is given, it is generally held that the attachment lien
still exists, the bond being a substitute for the property, and that the
attachment may stil be attacked for any defects. Larimore v. Parhcr,
101 Kan. 729, 168 Pac. 859 (1917); Hobson & Co. v. Hall, 10 Ky. L. Rep.
635 (1888); Smith v. Lacey, 86 Miss. 295, 38 So. 311 (1905); see Fleming
v. Clark, 22 Mlo. App. 218, 222 (1886). But if the former type of bond is
given, the statute usually provides that the attachment will be discharged,
and the defendant is held to be precluded from subsequently attacking it.
Hill v. Harding, 93 Ill. 77 (1879); Fox v,. Mackenzie, 1 N. D. 298, 47 N.
W. 386 (1890); Brady v. Onffroy, 37 Wash. 482, 79 Pac. 1001 (1905).
Contra: Edwards Co. v. Goldstein, 80 Ohio St. 303, 88 N. E. 877 (1909);
see Mueller v. Goldober, 252 S. W. 1076, 1078 (Tex. 1923). A few statutes,
including those of New York and South Carolina, provide only for the
giving of a judgment bond. CONN. GEN. STAT. (1918) § 5913; N. Y. C. P.
A. § 953; S. C. CODE CIv. PRAC. (1922) § 517. And in both New York
and South Carolina the statutes provide that the giving of such a bond
"discharges" the attachment. N. Y. C. P. A. § 952; S. C. CODE CIV. Pr.4G
(1922) § 516. But in both of these states the defendant or his sureties can
still attack the attachment on the ground that it is "void." Homan V.
Brinckerhoff, 1 Denio 184 (N. Y. 1845) (required attachment bond had
not been given by the plaintiff to the court issuing attachment writ) ; Voco
v. Cockroft, 44 N. Y. 415 (1871) (statute authorizing the attachment held
unconstitutional and the "levy" void); Bates v. Killian, 17 S. C. 553
(1882) (attachment affidavit attacked on ground statements therein were
false). On the other hand, by giving the bond the defendant is held to
have waived his right to attack the attachment for "irregularities" in the
proceedings. Cruyt v. Phillips, 16 How. Pr. 120 (N. Y. Sup. CL. 1858)
(insufficient statements in the plaintiff's affidavit); Coleman v. Bean, 32
How. Pr. 370 (N. Y. 1866) (fact that no attachment was ever actually
issued held no defense in action on the defendant's bond); DuRant v.
Brown Motors Co., 147 S. C. 88, 144 S. E. 705 (1928) (levy made by sheriU
19291
YALE LAW JOURNAL
of wrong county). The desirability of attempting to distinguish between
an attachment that is "void" and one that is merely "irregular" is doubtful.
Since a ground for attack upon the attachment in the instant case was
that the complaint failed to state a cause of action, it seems that the court
properly considered the defendant's motion to vacate the attachment even
after the giving of the judgment bond.
REAL PROPERTY-TORRENS SYSTEM-IMPEACHMENT OF TITLE FOR FORO-
Ey.R-The petitioners were owners of certain real estate, title to which
had been registered in their names and a certificate of title issued to them
under the Torrens Law. ILL. REV. STAT. (Cahill, 1927) c. 30, §§ 49-157.
They contracted to sell the land to N 'and delivered their certificate of title
to him. Subsequently N forged a deed conveying the land to himself, and
obtained the cancellation of the petitioners' certificate of title and the
registration of title in his own name. Before the discovery of the forgery,
N conveyed the land to the defendants who were bona fide purchasers for
value. After presenting to the registrar N's certificate of title and his
deed to themselves, title to the land was registered in the names of the
defendants. Suit was brought to cancel the registrations of N and of the
defendants and to re-issue a certificate of title to the petitioners. A de-
murrer to the petition was sustained by the lower court. Held, on appeal
(one justice dissenting), that the judgment be affirmed. Eliason v. Wilborn,
167 N. E. 101 (I1. 1929).
The question of the validity under the Torrens Law of a registered
title based upon a forged conveyance, although one of first impression in
America, seems settled in the courts of the British Empire. HoGG, REGIS-
TRATION OF T=rLE TO LAND THROUGHOUT THE EMPIRE (1st ed. 1920) 143 et
seq.; THOM, THE CANADIAN TORRENS SYSTEM (1st ed. 1912) 191-192.
There, in general, the original registered owner who has been defrauded
through forgery can not recover his land from a subsequent registered
holder thereof if such holder can prove that he himself or an intervening
registered predecessor was the bona fide grantee of a genuine deed of
conveyance from a grantor in whose name title to the land was then regis-
tered. See Gibbs v. Messer, [1891] A. C. 248, 254. A bona fide purchaser
for value will not obtain an indefeasible title by registration if the deed
to himself under which his title was registered was forged. Ex parte
Davy, 6 N. Z. L. R. 760 (1888); Attorney General v. Odell, [1906] 2 Ch.
47. And where a forged deed purports to convey title to a fictitious person
and registration is obtained in that name, a bona fide "grantee" of a "con-
veyance" from such a non-existent person is similarly unprotected against
the defrauded owner. Gibbs v. Messer, supra. But where, as in the instant
case, the purchaser takes a genuine deed from a grantor in whose name
the title is registered, his title cannot be impeached after registration by a
showing that the deed under which his grantor obtained registration was
forged. Bailey v. Cribb, 2 Queens. L. J. 42 (1884); Brown -v. Broughton, 25
Man. Rep. 489 (1915). The distinction seems a proper one, giving sufficient
protection to the innocent purchaser without rewarding the imprudently gul-
lible one. But if the purchase is made with knowledge of the antecedent
fraud, the purchaser will not be protected. McInnis v. Getsman, 1 Sask. L.
R. 172 (1908). A dispossessed owner may be indemnified from the assurance
fund established by the Torrens Law for his protection. Anderson v. Davy,
1 N. Z. L. R. 302 (1882). The instant case seems to depart from the tend-
ency of American decisions to impair the conclusiveness of a Torrens title.
Cf. Follette v. Pacific Light and Power Corp., 189 Cal. 193, 208 Pac. 295
(1922) (adverse possession held to be constructive notice of unregistered ad-
verse claim); Hooper v. Haas, 332 Ill. 561, 164 N. E. 23 (1928) (execution
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purchaser of a registered title held to have had constructive notice'of an
unrecorded dedication); Henry v. White, 123 Minn. 182, 185, 143 N. W.
324, 325 (1913) (transferees said to have notice of all defects in the title
apparent from the judgment roll of the original registration proceedings);
Staples, The Conclusiveness of a Torreiv Certificate of Titza (1924) 8
MINN. L. Ruy. 200; Note (1929) 43 H-aiV. L. RuY. 945; (1929) 42 HAnT.
L. REv. 837; Note L. R. A. 1916D 14. Notwithstanding the opportunity
offered the unscrupulous by the instant decision, a contrary rule would
defeat the very purpose of the Torrens Law and give no more security
to titles than under the old recording system where the defrauded owner
may recover his land from anyone having a forged deed in his cAin of
title. Kline v. Mueller, 135 Okla. 123, 276 Pac. 200 (1928). For a general
discussion of the Torrens System, see Niblach, Pirotal Points in the Torr=
System (1915) 24 YALE L. J. 274.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS-ORAL CONTRACT LIMDE IN CONSIDZATION OF AIM-
RnAqE-SUFFICENCY OF MEMORANDUM ExEcuTnD A2ra LIAnx -Beforo
marriage the plaintiff and the decedent entered into an oral contract in
consideration of marriage whereby the plaintiff agreed to accept an annu-
ity in lieu of her statutory allowance in the estate of the decedent. A
memorandum of the contract was executed eight years after marriage.
Upon the death of the decedent, the plaintiff petitioned for payment in
accordance with the statutory allowance. The defendants, executors of the
decedent's estate, set up the oral contract and the memorandum. The lower
court granted the petition. Held on appeal, that the oral contract could not
be validated by the execution of a memorandum after marriage, the South
Dakota statute of frauds declaring such contracts, in the absence of a
memorandum, to be "invalid." Judgment affirmed. Petcrson v. Peterson,
226 N. W. 641 (S. D. 1929).
A memorandum of an oral contract in consideration of marriage, al-
though executed after marriage, has been held sufficient to satisfy thoze
statutes which declare such oral contracts to be "unenforceable." Haraldson
v. Knutson, 142 Minn. 109, 171 N. W. 201 (1919); Smith v. Lfunscll, 94
Vt. 201, 110 Atl. 12 (1920). But an opposite result has been reached under
statutes declaring the contracts to be "invalid" or "void," on the ground
that the oral contract, being void under the statute, cannot h-a validated
by the execution of a memorandum at a time when the parties no longer
have the power to enter into a contract in consideration of marriage.
Rowell v. Barber, 142 Wis. 304, 125 N. W. 937 (1910); Fischer v. Dohtig,
39 N. D. 161, 166 N. W. 793 (1918). It is probable that the legislaturc,
by the use of the word "void" did not intend to vary the operation of the
statute, but merely to follow prior language of the courts inaccurately
describing such oral contracts as "void." Cf. 1 WILLISToN, CONTRACrS
(1920) § 531. Even under the second type of statute, oral contracts are
not utterly devoid of legal operation. Lorenen, Statute of Frauds (1923)
32 YALE L. J. 311, 322. For example, the statute may not be relied upon
unless pleaded. Tolleson v. Henson, 207 Ala. 529, 93 So. 458 (1922); Sin-
clair v. Purdy, 235 N. Y. 245, 139 N. E. 255 (1923); Contra: Hcndry v.
Bird, 135 Wash. 174, 237 Pac. 317 (1925). And where the contract has
been largely peformed by one party and the benefit of the performance
received by the other party, the latter may not rely upon the statute as a
defense. Lampert Lumber Co. v. Pexa, 44 S. D. 382, 184 N. W. 207 (1921) ;
cf. Sackett v. Rodeck, 75 Colo. 425, 226 Pac. 295 (1924). And, in an action
against a party to an oral contract, one who is not a party thereto may
not rely upon the statutory invalidity of the contract. Stitt v. Ward, 142
App. Div. 626, 127 N. Y. Supp. 351 (1st T),-n'f 1911): Happ v. Ducey, 110
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Neb. 429, 193 N. W. 918 (1923). Generally, the execution of a memoran-
dum at any time prior to suit is sufficient to satisfy either type of statute.
1 WILLISTON, op. Cit. supra § 590. Therefore, where rights of third parties
have not intervened, it would seem that the execution of a memorandum
of an oral contract made in consideration of marriage at any time prior
to suit, even though after marriage, should be sufficient.
TORTS-INDUCING BREACH OF CONTRACT TO PAY WAGES.-The defendanb
company wrongfully notified the plaintiff's employer that it held a valid
assignment of the plaintiff's wages. The employer thereupon withheld
the wages, greatly inconveniencing the plaintiff and forcing him to employ
an attorney to collect them. The plaintiff brought suit for compensatory
and punitive damages, and was nonsuited. Held, on appeal, that the judg-
ment be affirmed. Pickens v. Hal J. Copeland Grocery Co., 123 So. 223
(Ala. 1929).
Inducing one person to break his contract with another is generally
considered actionable. BURDICK, LAW OF TORTS (3d ed. 1913) 79. This. is
true even where the contract is one of employment terminable at will.
See Tennessee Coal, Iron & Ry. Co. v. Kelly, 163 Ala. 348, 352, 50 So. 1008,
1010 (1909); Note (1924) 29 A. L. R. 532, 535. In the absence of fraud
or coercion, a few jurisdictions purport to limit such actions to cases where
the breach is of a contract by an employee to render personal services to
the plaintiff. See Boyson v. Thorn, 98 Cal. 578, 580, 582, 33 Pac. 492, 493
(1893) ; Swain v. Johnson, 151 N. C. 93, 94, 65 S. E. 619 (1909) ; Erwell
v. Ford, 208 Ala. 101, 103, 94 So. 67, 69 (1922). But see Sayre, Inducing
Breach of Contract (1922) 36 HARV. L. Rnv. 663, 670 et seq. In Alabama,
a jurisdiction which purports to follow the latter rule, recovery has also
been allowed where the defendant, by falsely representing that the plain-
tiff had assigned his wages, induced the latter's employer to discharge
him. Southern Finance Co. v. Foster, 19 Ala. App. 109, 95 So. 338 (1923) ;
cf. United States F. & G. Co. v. Millonas, 206 Ala. 147, 89 So. 732 (1921)
(recovery allowed for coercing employer to discharge plaintiff); Note
(1924) 29 A. L. R. 532. The instant court attempts to distinguish between
discharge and a mere withholding of wages as a basis for denying recovery.
A recent New York case made no such distinction. Hornstein v. Podwitz,
224 App. Div. 11, 229 N. Y. Supp. 159 (1st Dep't 1928) (recovery allowed
for inducing the withholding of commissions earned). Contra: Wcinbcrg
v. Iirwinessie Holding Corp., 225 App. Div. 241, 232 N. Y. Supp. 443 (2d
Dep't 1929). Where a debtor was induced by the defendant not to pay his
creditor, recovery has been denied on the theory that the action was akin
to one for malicious prosecution. Norcross v. Otis, 152 Pa. 481, 25 Atl. 575
(1893). But this theory was rejected in the instant case, and the denial
of a recovery was justified on the ground that the plaintiff's cause of action
against his employer was sufficient. Such an action by the plaintiff, how-
ever, might result in his discharge, with consequent enhancement of dam-
ages. To deny relief on such a ground seems unsound. See Knickerbocker
Ice Co. v. Gardiner Dairy Co., 107 Md. 556, 562, 69 Atl. 405, 407 (1908);
(1929) 29 COL. L. RiEv. 679.
294 [Vol. 39
